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Abstract
For the allocation of heterogeneous items, it is known that the buyers-
are-substitutes condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that a pricing
equilibrium can yield the same allocation and payments as the VCG mecha-
nism. Furthermore, concavity of the corresponding TU-game guarantees that
this VCG outcome can also be achieved by an ascending price auction. We
show that concavity, and hence the buyers-are-substitutes condition, holds
for the TU-game of the assignment problem with general capacities. There-
fore, the VCG mechanism is supported by a pricing equilibrium which can
also be achieved by an ascending auction. We also show that the buyers-
are-substitutes condition, and hence concavity, does not hold anymore for
very natural and straightforward extensions of this problem. This shows that
the necessity of the substitutes property is a considerable restriction on the
applicability of the VCG mechanism.
Keywords: Equilibria, VCG outcome, Buyers-are-substitutes condition,
Concavity
1 Introduction
In the setting of an exchange economy, auctions are very popular and fast mecha-
nisms concerning the reallocation of goods (or items in auction design terminology).
A well known auction is the so-called VCG mechanism, named after Vickrey (1961),
Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973). The VCG mechanism has the nice properties that
it both maximizes total welfare, and gives the bidders the incentive to bid their
valuations. Although very nice in theory, the practical applicability of the VCG
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mechanism is limited. It has two main drawbacks. First, the final allocation does
not necessarily correspond to a pricing equilibrium, which implies that the auction
allocation is not the final allocation in the exchange economy. Second, the VCG
mechanism might ask for a lot of computation and communication of confidential
information. The central question we study in this paper, is for which exchange
economies the VCG mechanism is applicable, i.e., the main drawbacks do not apply.
We therefore consider both the relation between the VCG mechanism and pricing
equilibria, and the relation between the VCG mechanism and a primal-dual auction
that does not suffers from the second drawback.
Leonard (1983) has shown for the classical assignment problem that the VCG mech-
anism is supported by any minimal price equilibrium with linear prices. In more
general settings, the link between price equilibria and the VCG mechanism is missing
and additional conditions are needed to recover it. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)
and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) have studied the case where buyers bid for
bundles of indivisible items. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) first show that in the
class of linear prices we may not find, in general, a price equilibrium. Therefore,
they propose a richer class of prices, namely non-anonymous bundle prices. They
show a result similar to Leonard (1983) if and only if the buyers are substitutes.
Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) propose a combinatorial ascending price auction
as the trading mechanism in the exchange economy. Under the stronger condition
saying that the associated TU-game is concave, they show that the auction termi-
nates in VCG payments. Apart from the argument that ascending auctions need
less communication, there is also some empirical evidence that ascending auctions
are more useful than the VCG mechanism itself. In experimental tests of Kagel
and Levin (2001) it appears that in ascending auctions more players actually play
the equilibrium strategy compared to the Vickrey auction. Players learn from the
repetitive character of the auction and see less imaginary advantages from lying.
In this paper we first address the assignment problem with capacities, where buy-
ers can bid for collections of items but the valuations are linear. We show that
the corresponding TU-game is concave. Moreover, we show that this problem is a
special case of the models discussed by Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries,
Schummer, and Vohra (2005) and therefore their results can be applied to this set-
ting. Specifically, this means that the VCG mechanism corresponds to a pricing
equilibrium, and the VCG mechanism can be replaced by the primal-dual auction.
However, the concavity, and even the buyers-are-substitutes property, does not hold
anymore when we include setup costs in the valuations of the buyers or when the
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items have different sizes, which we show by two counterexamples. We conclude
that even for very straightforward extensions of the assignment problem we cannot
ensure that the VCG mechanism is supported by price equilibria. Finally, we show
that it may be necessary to have non-anonymous prices in the pricing equilibrium
that corresponds to the VCG mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the
basic definitions of mechanism design and TU-games. In section 3 we introduce the
assignment problem with capacities and show that the corresponding TU-game is
concave. In section 4 we present the results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and
Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) and show that they apply to the assignment
problem with capacities. In section 5 we present two extensions of the assignment
problem with capacities and show that the VCG mechanism is not supported, in
general, by price equilibria. The paper ends with a summary of our results.
2 Preliminaries
First we will briefly review the notions borrowed from mechanism design that we
need in this paper. Let A be a set of agents. Let Ta denote the type space of agent
a ∈ A. Agents’ types are assumed to be private information. Write T :=
∏
a∈A Ta
for the space of type profiles. Let O be the set of outcomes. By va(ta, o) we denote
the valuation that agent a assigns to outcome o when being of type ta. Agents
are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities. Thus, the net valuation (or payoff) for
outcome o and payment p of an agent a being of type ta is given by va(ta, o)− p.
The aim of mechanism design is to implement a given social choice function ω : T →
O that chooses the outcome ω(t) in O when t = (ta)a∈A is the realization of types
over agents. Write
V (A, t) := max
o∈O
∑
a∈A
va(ta, o)
for the maximal total valuation. An outcome o is called efficient if
∑
a∈A
va(ta, o) = V (A, t).
A social choice function ω is said to be utilitarian if ω(t) is an efficient outcome for
any profile t = (ta)a∈A of types.
VCG MECHANISMS Let ω be a utilitarian social choice function. The following VCG
mechanism implements ω. Let r = (ra)a∈A be the profile of types reported by the
agents. The VCG mechanism chooses the outcome ω(r). Payments are defined as
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follows. Let r−a = (rb)b∈A\{a} denote the profile of types reported by all agents
except a. The payment for agent a is given by
pa(r) := V (A \ {a}, r
−a)− V (A, r) + va(ra, ω(r)),
the so-called Vickrey payment. The VCG mechanism has several nice properties, see
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). Most importantly, reporting truthfully is
a weakly dominant strategy. Due to this property the mechanism does indeed choose
the outcome ω(t) in equilibrium, and the resulting net utility (or payoff) of agent a
is equal to his marginal contribution
V (A, t)− V (A \ {a}, t−a).
TU-GAMES We also briefly discuss the notions we need from cooperative game the-
ory. A transferable utility game, or TU-game, is a pair (N, v) with set of players N
and characteristic function v : 2N → R with v(φ) = 0. A vector u = (ui)i∈N ∈ R
N
is a core element of the game (N, v) if
∑
i∈S ui ≥ v(S) for all coalitions S ⊂ N , and∑
i∈N ui = v(N).
Following Shapley (1962) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), we define the players-
are-substitutes property as follows. A coalition B of players in N are substitutes in
the game (N, v) if for all coalitions S ⊆ B it holds that
v(N)− v(N \ S) ≥
∑
i∈S
(v(N)− v(N \ {i})).
The game v is concave if for any two subsets S and T of N
v(S) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
An equivalent statement is that
v(S ∪ {a})− v(S) ≥ v(S ∪ {a, b})− v(S ∪ {b})
holds for any coalition S ⊆ N and any a, b /∈ S with a 6= b. In this paper we will
use the following well-known proposition.
Proposition 1 If (N, v) is concave, then the players in N are substitutes in (N, v).
3 The assignment problem with capacities is con-
cave
In this section we analyze the assignment problem with capacities (APC) defined as
follows. Let B be a set of buyers and I a set of items to be allocated to the buyers.
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Each buyer b ∈ B has a valuation vbi ≥ 0 for item i ∈ I, and a capacity Rb ≥ 0. All
items are assumed to have size one, so the capacity Rb of buyer b in fact indicates
that buyer b wants at most Rb items.
The goal of the assignment problem with capacities is to assign the items in such
a way that no capacity restriction is violated and the total valuation is maximized.
Thus, the assignment problem APC(B, I) with capacities (Rb)b∈B is to
maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈I vbixbi
subject to
∑
i∈I xbi ≤ Rb ∀b ∈ B
∑
b∈B xbi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xbi ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
(APC)
where xbi is equal to 1 if item i is assigned to buyer b.
The optimal solution value of APC(B, I) is denoted by VAPC(B, I). Now notice that,
for a set of buyers A ⊆ B, the problem APC(A, I) can be seen as a subproblem of
APC(B, I) by adding the constraints xbi = 0 for all i ∈ I and b /∈ A to APC(B, I).
Thus it makes sense to consider the TU-game (B, vAPC) defined by vAPC(A) :=
VAPC(A, I) for all A ⊆ B. The remainder of this section is used to prove concavity
of this particular TU-game. The proof is in two parts. First we will prove concavity
of this game in case all capacities Rb are equal to one, the classical assignment
problem. Then we will use this partial result to prove concavity of the TU-game for
the general problem.
Theorem 1 Assume that Rb = 1 for all b ∈ B. Then the corresponding TU-game
(B, vAPC) is concave.
Proof. It suffices to prove that
VAPC(A ∪ {a}, I)− VAPC(A, I) ≥ VAPC(A ∪ {a, b}, I)− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I)
holds for any subset A of B and any a, b /∈ A with a 6= b. We show this by induction
to the number of elements of A.
Suppose that A = φ. Obviously VAPC(φ, I) = 0. Thus, for any set I,
VAPC({a}, I)− VAPC(φ, I) ≥ VAPC({a, b}, I)− VAPC({b}, I),
since VAPC({a}, I)+VAPC({b}, I) ≥ VAPC({a, b}, I) easily follows from the optimal-
ity of the left hand side.
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Suppose that the conditions are fulfilled for all coalitions A of B with |A| ≤ k. Take
a set A with |A| = k + 1. Let a and b be two different buyers in B that are not in
A. Take an item i ∈ I. First we show that
VAPC(A, I)− VAPC(A, I \ {i}) ≤ VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I)− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I \ {i}).
Consider the instance APC(A, I) of the assignment problem. If item i is not assigned
to any buyer in an optimal allocation, the inequality holds trivially as the left hand
side will be equal to zero. So, suppose that in an optimal allocation item i is assigned
to buyer c ∈ A. Then
VAPC(A, I) − VAPC(A, I \ {i})
= vci + VAPC(A \ {c}, I \ {i})− VAPC(A, I \ {i})
≤ vci + VAPC((A ∪ {b}) \ {c}, I \ {i})− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I \ {i})
≤ VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I)− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I \ {i}),
where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis.
Now consider the problem instance APC(A ∪ {a, b}, I), and suppose that in an
optimal assignment buyer a gets item j ∈ I. Then, using our previous observation
to get the first inequality, we have
VAPC(A ∪ {a, b}, I) − VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I)
= vaj + VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I \ {j})− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I)
≤ vaj + VAPC(A, I \ {j})− VAPC(A, I)
≤ VAPC(A ∪ {a}, I)− VAPC(A, I).
So in this case we found that
VAPC(A ∪ {a}, I)− VAPC(A, I) ≥ VAPC(A ∪ {a, b}, I)− VAPC(A ∪ {b}, I).
If in an optimal allocation no item is assigned to buyer a, this inequality still holds
as the right hand side will be equal to zero. 2
The theorem above is an extension of the result of Shapley (1962) who proved that
buyers are substitutes in the classical assignment problem, i.e., where Rb = 1 for all
b ∈ B. The result of Shapley follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. We will
now prove the concavity of the TU-game (B, vAPC).
Theorem 2 The TU-game (B, vAPC) is concave.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that Rb is integer for all b ∈ B.
First split each buyer b ∈ B into Rb buyers b1, . . . , bRb with capacities Rbr = 1 and
valuations wbr,i := vbi. Let B
◦ denote the new set of buyers. From Theorem 1 we
know that (B◦, w) is concave. Let S and T be two coalitions in B and let S◦ and
T ◦ be the corresponding coalitions in B◦. Then
vAPC(S) + vAPC(T ) = w(S
◦) + w(T ◦)
≥ w(S◦ ∪ T ◦) + w(S◦ ∩ T ◦)
= w((S ∪ T )◦) + w((S ∩ T )◦)
= vAPC(S ∪ T ) + vAPC(S ∩ T ),
since for any coalition A ⊂ B the assignment problem APC(A◦, I) with unit capac-
ities we constructed has the same objective value as APC(A, I). 2
Topkis (1998) proved that the optimal value of the objective function of the trans-
portation problem is a submodular function of the agents’ capacities. The trans-
portation problem is an equivalent formulation to (APC) in terms of cost minimiza-
tion. Our proof is easier and shorter though, and is also valid if total capacity is
smaller than total demand.
4 Two applications
The main object of study in both Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schum-
mer, and Vohra (2005) is an exchange economy with a set B of buyers and a set I
of (indivisible) items to be sold by a single seller indicated by s. In fact this is a
special case of the setting of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002), since they initially
also allowed multiple sellers. The valuation of buyer b for the set S ⊆ I of items is
vbS ≥ 0. Valuations are assumed to be non-decreasing, i.e., vbS ≤ vbT for all buyers
b ∈ B and all sets S, T ⊆ I with S ⊆ T , and vbφ = 0 for all buyers b ∈ B.
4.1 The result of Bikhchandani and Ostroy
The main result of Bickhchandani and Ostroy in this setting provides a link between
minimal prices in a price equilibrium, the outcome of the VCG mechanism in this
setting, and a TU-game that can be associated with this exchange economy. We
will briefly discuss all relevant notions.
A price equilibrium in this setting is a price vector p = (pbS)b∈B,S⊆I together with a
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partition T = (Tb)b∈B of I such that
vbTb − pbTb ≥ vbS − pbS
holds for all b ∈ B and S ⊆ I, and
∑
b∈B
pbTb ≥
∑
b∈B
pbSb
holds for all partitions (Sb)b∈B of I. Such a price equilibrium corresponds to an
economy where there are no resale possibilities. Tb is interpreted as the set of items
allocated to buyer b in B. This economy is called E3 in Bikhchandani and Ostroy
(2002). A price equilibrium (p, T ) is said to be minimal if for any other price
equilibrium (q, S) it holds that
vbTb − pbTb ≥ vbSb − qbSb
for all b ∈ B. A minimal equilibrium price vector is a price vector that is part of a
minimal price equilibrium.
Alternatively the seller might decide to organize a combinatorial auction and use the
VCG mechanism to sell the items in I. Given that the buyers report their valuations
truthfully under this mechanism, the mechanism returns a partition (Tb)b∈B of I such
that ∑
b∈B
vbTb ≥
∑
b∈B
vbSb
for any partition (Sb)b∈B of I, together with a payment
p(b∗) :=
∑
b6=b∗
vbUb −
∑
b6=b∗
vbTb
of buyer b∗ to the seller, where (Ub)b6=b∗ is a partition of I such that
∑
b6=b∗
vbUb ≥
∑
b6=b∗
vbSb
for any partition (Sb)b6=b∗ of I. This results in a net utility of
u(b∗) := vb∗Tb∗ − p(b
∗) =
∑
b∈B
vbTb −
∑
b6=b∗
vbUb
for buyer b∗ and a revenue of u(s) :=
∑
b∈B p(b) for the seller.
A third option for the agents in the economy is to cooperate. This leads to a TU-
game (N, vB&O), where N = B ∪ {s}, defined as follows. For a coalition A ⊆ B of
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buyers, vB&O(A) = 0. The value vB&O(A∪ {s}) is computed as follows. Let (Tb)b∈A
denote a partition of I. The set of all such partitions is denoted by P(A). Then
vB&O(A ∪ {s}) := max{
∑
b∈A
vbTb | (Tb)b∈A ∈ P(A)}.
Theorem 6.1 of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) enables us to link these three differ-
ent approaches to trade in the exchange economy with each other. Let T = (Tb)b∈B
and (p(b))b∈B be the allocation and the payment vector of the VCG mechanism. A
price vector p = (pbS)b∈B,S⊆I is said to support the VCG mechanism if (p, T ) is a
price equilibrium, and moreover p(b) = pbTb holds for all buyers b ∈ B. Theorem 6.1
of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) now states the following.
Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent.
(1) Buyers are substitutes in the TU-game (N, vB&O).
(2) The vector (u(s), (u(b)b∈B) of net utilities is a core allocation of the TU-game
(N, vB&O).
(3) Any minimal equilibrium price vector supports the VCG mechanism.
4.2 Application to the assignment problem with capacities
Consider the assignment problem with capacities with buyer set B, item set I,
valuations vbi and capacities Rb as it is defined in Section 3. This problem can also
be seen as an exchange economy with valuations given by
vbS := VAPC({b}, S)
for each buyer b ∈ B and each set of items S ⊆ I. Clearly, the valuations defined in
this way are non-decreasing. Thus, in the light of Theorem 3 of Bikhchandani and
Ostroy, the question arises whether buyers are substitutes in the game (N, vB&O)
associated with this exchange economy. Using our results from the previous section
we will now show that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 4 Buyers are substitutes in the TU-game (N, vB&O).
Proof. Notice that it suffices to prove that all players in B are substitutes in the
TU-game (B,w) defined by
w(A) := max{
∑
b∈A
vbTb | (Tb)b∈A ∈ P(A)}
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for all coalitions A ⊆ B. Therefore
w(A) = max{
∑
b∈A
vbTb | (Tb)b∈A ∈ P(A)} = VAPC(A, I) = vAPC(A),
and (B,w) is concave by Theorem 2. Hence, by Proposition 1, the players in B are
substitutes in the game (B,w). 2
4.3 The result of De Vries, Schummer and Vohra
Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) consider the same single seller exchange econ-
omy, defined in the beginning of this section, as Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002)
with the extra assumption that all vbS are integer.
They consider a combinatorial ascending price auction, called the Primal Dual auc-
tion or PD auction for short, as the trading mechanism in the exchange economy.
To define the PD auction we first need to introduce some notation.
Given a vector of prices p, the most preferred sets of items for buyer b are
Db := {T ⊆ I | vbT − pbT ≥ vbS − pbS for all S ⊆ I}.
Let F ⊆ B be a set of buyers. A vector (Tb)b∈F is called feasible for F if Tb ∈ Db for
every buyer b ∈ F and the elements of (Tb)b∈F are mutually disjoint. Let Z(F ) be
the set of all feasible vectors for F . Let Z∗(F ) denote the set of all feasible vectors
for F (Tb)b∈F such that ∑
b∈F
pbTb ≥
∑
b∈G
pbSb
holds for every G ⊆ B and every (Sb)b∈G ∈ Z(G). Let Z
∗ =
⋃
F⊆B Z
∗(F ). If for
F ⊆ B there is no (Tb)b∈F in Z
∗ we say that F is undersupplied. We say that
F is minimally undersupplied if F is undersupplied, and no proper subset of F is
undersupplied.
Now let B∗ be the set of buyers b ∈ B for which there exists an S ∈ Db with
vbS − pbS > 0. We say there is overdemand if B
∗ is undersupplied.
The PD auction is an iterative procedure defined as follows.
PD auction
Step 0. Choose prices pbS = 0 for all b ∈ B and S ⊆ I.
Step 1. With respect to the current prices, ask each buyer b to report his most
preferred sets of items, i.e., Db.
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Step 2. If overdemand holds, choose a minimally undersupplied set A ⊆ B∗ and
for each b ∈ A and each S ∈ Db increase the current price pbS by one unit
and return to Step 1. All other prices stay the same for the moment. (This
construction ensures in particular that pbφ = 0 throughout the auction.)
Step 3. If there is no overdemand, choose an element (Tb)b∈B in Z
∗, allocate the
items in Tb to buyer b ∈ B, and charge him current price pbTb .
Notice that we have some degree of freedom in the auction because of the freedom of
choice of the minimally undersupplied sets and the final allocation in Z∗. Any choice
made here yields a version of the PD auction. Nevertheless, as Vries, Schummer,
and Vohra (2005) show, any PD auction constructed in this way features truthful
reporting as an ex post Nash equilibrium, and in equilibrium it terminates in an
efficient assignment.
For a coalition A ⊆ B of buyers, define
vPD(A) := max{
∑
b∈A
vbTb | (Tb)b∈A ∈ P(A)}.
Theorem 4 of Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) states the following.
Theorem 5 Suppose that (B, vPD) is concave. Then any PD auction terminates in
VCG payments.
4.4 Application to the assignment problem with capacities
Again we can apply the result under consideration to the assignment problem with
capacities. Using our result concerning the concavity of (B, vAPC) we can show the
following statement in the context of the assignment problem with capacities.
Theorem 6 A PD auction applied to the assignment problem with capacities gen-
erates a price vector p and an allocation T that constitute a price equilibrium (p, T ).
Moreover, p supports the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Let p = (pbS)b∈B,S⊆I be the price vector generated by a certain PD auction,
and let T = (Tb)b∈B be the corresponding final allocation. Since the PD auction
terminates in an efficient allocation in equilibrium, we may assume that T together
with the VCG payments (p(b))b∈B is the outcome of the VCG mechanism.
It is clear that vAPC = vPD. Hence, by Theorem 2 and Theorem 5 we have that
p(b) = pbTb holds for all buyers b ∈ B. Thus, it remains to show that (p, T ) is a price
equilibrium.
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Since T = (Tb)b∈B is an element of Z
∗, it is in particular feasible. Thus we know
that Tb ∈ Db for each buyer b ∈ B, and hence
vbTb − pbTb ≥ vbS − pbS
for all S ⊆ I. Finally we show that
∑
b∈B
pbTb ≥
∑
b∈B
pbSb
holds for all partitions (Sb)b∈B of I. Take a partition (Sb)b∈B of I. Let B
+ be the
set of buyers b for which pbSb > 0. Let b be a buyer in B
+. Since pbSb > 0, we
know that somewhere during the auction Sb ∈ Db. However, due to the fact that
valuations are integral and that all prices of sets in the demand of an undersupplied
buyer increase in steps of size one, it is evident that Sb ∈ Db will remain true for
the remaining time the auction runs. Thus, (Sb)b∈B+ is a feasible vector for B
+. So,
since T = (Tb)b∈B is an element of Z
∗ and pbSb = 0 for all b /∈ B
+, we know that
∑
b∈B
pbTb ≥
∑
b∈B+
pbSb =
∑
b∈B
pbSb
which completes the proof. 2
5 Impossibilities
In the previous section we proved that the TU-game associated with the assignment
problem with capacities is concave. Therefore the buyers are substitutes in this TU-
game, according to Proposition 1. Unfortunately concavity, and even the buyers-
are-substitutes property gets lost for other small and rather natural extensions of
the assignment problem.
We also give a simple example of (APC) with a unique optimal assignment in which
the VCG outcome is not supported by a price equilibrium where the prices are
anonymous. Therefore, in general, the richer class of prices used by Bikhchandani
and Ostroy, namely non-anonymous bundle prices, cannot be simplified for the as-
signment problem with capacities.
5.1 Generalized assignment problem
In this section we consider the case where each item i ∈ I consumes an amount rci
of the capacity of the buyers. This yields to the so-called Generalized Assignment
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Problem (GAP) with buyer independent resource consumption. The problem reads
as follows
maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈I vbixbi
subject to
∑
i∈I rcixbi ≤ Rb ∀b ∈ B
∑
b∈B xbi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xbi ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I.
(GAP)
The value vGAP (A) for a coalition A of buyers is the optimal value of the objective
function in the above (GAP) with the additional constraints that xbi = 0 whenever
b /∈ A.
In the resulting TU-game (B, vGAP ) the players will in general not be substitutes as
the next example shows. Hence, also concavity will not hold in general.
Take buyer set B = {a, b, c} with capacities Ra = 2, Rb = 2 and Rc = 1 respectively.
Take set of items I = {i, j, k} with resource consumption rci = 2, rcj = 1 and
rck = 1 respectively. The buyers’ valuations for the items are given in the table
below.
i j k
a 6 5 5
b 0 0 3
c 0 3 0
Table 1: Valuations for GAP
Given these valuations it is easy to see that vGAP (a, b, c) = 12, vGAP (a, c) = vGAP (a, b) =
10 and vGAP (a) = 10, which violates the substitutes condition
vGAP (a, b, c)− vGAP (a) ≥ 2 vGAP (a, b, c)− vGAP (a, c)− vGAP (a, b).
Since for this problem instance of (GAP) the buyers-are-substitutes property does
not hold, we know that the VCG mechanism is not supported by a price equilibrium.
Let us illustrate this. We have that vGAP (b, c) = 6. Thus, the net utilities of buyers
a, b and c are equal to 12 − 6 = 6, 12 − 10 = 2 and 12 − 10 = 2, respectively.
According to the optimal allocation, the buyers’ payments are equal to 0, 1 and
1, respectively. This yields an auction revenue of 2. As the only optimal solution
assigns item i to buyer a and items j and k to buyers c and b respectively, we have
that in equilibrium 6− pa{i} ≥ 10− pa{j,k}. From the VCG payments we know that
pa{i} = 0, so pa{j,k} ≥ 4, which gives the auctioneer a revenue of at least 4 > 2.
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In a similar way, the vector of prices generated by the PD auction does not support
the VCG mechanism. We will show that any PD auction will terminate with pa{j,k} =
4. Thus, as before, p cannot be a price equilibrium. Any PD auction starts with
all prices equal to zero. This gives the following initial demand sets (assuming
disposability):
Da = {{j, k}, {i, j, k}}
Db = {{k}, {j, k}, {i, k}, {i, j, k}}
Dc = {{j}, {i, j}, {j, k}, {i, j, k}}.
Here B∗ = {a, b, c} is undersupplied as buyer a wants at least both j and k, buyer b
wants at least item k and buyer c wants at least item j. The minimally undersupplied
sets are {a, b} and {a, c}. Suppose that we choose {a, b}. The algorithm would then
raise the price of all sets in Da and Db. After this first price-raise the demand sets
remain the same, so we can do the same raise again, and even a third time. After
the third iteration Da is still the same, but now Db = 2
I . Then the only minimally
undersupplied set is {a, c}, so we raise the prices in Da a fourth time and also the
prices in Dc. After this, {i} ∈ Da. Because there is no overdemand anymore the
algorithm will stop with pa{j,k} = 4. We arrive to the same conclusion if we choose
{a, c} as the undersupplied set in the first iteration.
5.2 Setup costs
The planning problem assumes a linear valuation function for the buyers. In this
section we include a setup cost fa in the valuation function. This results in the
following linear program (APCS).
maximize
∑
b∈B
∑
i∈I vbixbi −
∑
b∈B fbyb
subject to
∑
i∈I rcixbi ≤ Rbyb ∀b ∈ B
∑
b∈B xbi ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xbi ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B, ∀i ∈ I
yb ∈ {0, 1} ∀b ∈ B
where xbi is defined as before and yb is equal to one if buyer b processes at least
one item. Again, for a coalition A ⊆ B of buyers the valuation vAPCS(A) is defined
as the optimal value of the objective function of the above program with the extra
conditions that xbi = 0 and yb = 0 whenever b /∈ A.
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Consider the problem instance with B = {a, b, c}, Ra = Rb = Rc = 2, and setup
costs of fa = 10, fb = 1 and fc = 1. Further, I = {i, j, k,m} and rci = rcj = rck =
rcm = 1. Valuations are given in the table below.
i j k m
a 4 4 6 6
b 1 1 2 1
c 1 1 1 10
Table 2: Valuations for APCS
It can easily be checked that vAPCS(a, b, c) = 12 (a gets no items, b gets items i
and k and c gets j and m), vAPCS(a, c) = 10 (a gets i and k, c gets j and m),
vAPCS(a, b) = 3 (a gets k and m, b gets i and j) and vAPCS(a) = 2 (a gets k and
m). Thus, the substitutes condition
vAPCS(a, b, c)− vAPCS(a) ≥ 2 vAPCS(a, b, c)− vAPCS(a, c)− vAPCS(a, b)
is violated.
Similarly to previous section, we will show that the VCG mechanism is not sup-
ported by a price equilibrium and that the PD auction does not support the VCG
mechanism. We have that vAPCS(b, c) = 12, so the net utilities of buyer a, b and c
are 12 − 12 = 0, 12 − 10 = 2 and 12 − 3 = 9, respectively. According to the opti-
mal allocation the buyers’ payments are 0, 0 and 1 respectively, yielding an auction
revenue of 1. Since in the only optimal solution buyer a gets no item, we have that
pa{k,m} ≥ 2. Therefore, the auction revenue is at least 2 > 1.
In any PD auction we can also see that we will not terminate before pa{k,m} ≥ 2. The
auction starts with all prices equal to zero. This gives the following initial demand
sets (assuming disposability):
Da = {S ⊆ B : k ∈ S,m ∈ S}
Db = {S ⊆ B : k ∈ S, |S| > 1}
Dc = {S ⊆ B : m ∈ S, |S| > 1}.
Here B∗ = {a, b, c} is undersupplied as buyer a wants at least items k and m, buyer
b wants at least item k and buyer c wants at least item m. The minimally undersup-
plied sets are {a, b} and {a, c}. Suppose that we choose {a, b}. The algorithm would
then raise the price of all sets in Da and Db. After this first price-raise Da remains
the same, but Db becomes {S ⊆ B : |S| > 1}. Now {a, b} is not undersupplied
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anymore, but {a, c} is. Therefore, after raising the prices in Da and Dc we have
that pa{k,m} ≥ 2. The same conclusion can be derived if we choose {a, c} as the
undersupplied set in the first iteration.
5.3 The VCG mechanism is not supported by anonymous
prices
Leonard (1983) showed for the classical assignment problem that the VCG mecha-
nism is supported by any minimal price equilibrium vector with linear prices. The-
orem 4 together with Theorem 3 shows that any minimal equilibrium price vector
supports the VCG mechanism for the assignment problem with capacities (APC).
But here the prices are not necessarily linear, and not even anonymous. We now
show for (APC) that we really need non-anonymous prices to support the VCG
mechanism.
Formally a price vector p = (pbS)b∈B,S⊆I is called anonymous if paS = pbS for all
buyers a and b in B and sets S ⊆ I of items. It is called linear if for each i ∈ I there
is a price φi such that
pbS =
∑
i∈S
φi
for all b ∈ B and all S ⊆ I. Obviously a linear price vector is also anonymous.
Consider the instance of (APC) with B = {a, b}, I = {i, j, k}, Ra = 1 and Rb = 2.
The buyers’ valuations are given by
i j k
a 5 4 2
b 5 4 1
Table 3: Valuations for APC
The unique optimal solution for this problem is that buyer a gets item k, and buyer
b gets items i and j. To calculate the VCG payments we also need the optimal
solutions for the problems excluding one buyer at a time. Obviously, when on his
own, a chooses item i, while b chooses items i and j when a is not present. The
VCG payments are therefore p(a) = 9− 9 = 0 and p(b) = 5− 2 = 3.
With these VCG payments we get the following conflicting conditions for linear
prices φi, φj and φk that form a price equilibrium with the allocation that assigns k
to a and i and j to b. From the coincidence of the equilibrium prices with the VCG
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payments we get that
φk = 0 and φi + φj = 3.
From the equilibrium conditions we get that
5− φi ≤ 2− φk and 4− φj ≤ 2− φk.
Using φk = 0, we have that φi ≥ 3 and φj ≥ 2. These conditions are clearly
conflicting with φi + φj = 3. From this we conclude that prices that support the
VCG mechanism are necessarily non-linear.
Now we also show that the prices cannot be anonymous. Let φij , φik and φjk be the
prices of the packages {i, j}, {i, k} and {j, k} respectively. By disposability player
a has valuations 5, 5 and 4 for these packages. From the equilibrium conditions we
therefore have that
5− φij ≤ 2− φk and 5− φik ≤ 2− φk and 4− φjk ≤ 2− φk.
So together with the conditions above we have that φi ≥ 3, φj ≥ 2, φk = 0, φij ≥ 3,
φik ≥ 3 and φjk ≥ 2. From the perspective of the auctioneer these prices mean that
the revenue from the auction is at least 5 by assigning for example i to buyer a and
j and k to buyer b. This contradicts with the VCG outcome in which the auction
has a revenue of 3.
6 Conclusions
We have studied the assignment problem with capacities. We have shown that the
corresponding TU-game is concave. Therefore, the results of Bikhchandani and
Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) on the equivalence between
the VCG mechanism and both price equilibria and ascending auctions hold. We have
extended the assignment problem with capacities in two directions. First, we have
studied the Generalized Assignment Problem with buyer independent consumptions.
Second, we have added setup costs to the buyers valuations. For both extensions,
the buyers-are-substitutes condition and therefore the concavity does not hold in
general. This means that for those problem instances, the outcome of the VCG
mechanism is not supported by a price equilibrium, and can not be achieved by
an ascending auction. It would be interesting to know whether for other classes of
problems this equivalence holds. Finally, we showed that the price equilibria that
are equivalent to the VCG mechanism may need non-anonymous prices.
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